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We compared strategies for stockpiling neuraminidase
inhibitors to treat and prevent influenza in Singapore. Cost-
benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, with Monte Carlo
simulations, were used to determine economic outcomes. A
pandemic in a population of 4.2 million would result in an
estimated 525–1,775 deaths, 10,700–38,600 hospitaliza-
tion days, and economic costs of $0.7 to $2.2 billion
Singapore dollars. The treatment-only strategy had optimal
economic benefits: stockpiles of antiviral agents for 40% of
the population would save an estimated 418 lives and $414
million, at a cost of $52.6 million per shelf-life cycle of the
stockpile. Prophylaxis was economically beneficial in high-
risk subpopulations, which account for 78% of deaths, and
in pandemics in which the death rate was >0.6%.
Prophylaxis for pandemics with a 5% case-fatality rate
would save 50,000 lives and $81 billion. These models can
help policymakers weigh the options for pandemic planning.
T
en percent of the world’s population and 20% of the
population of tropical Singapore are infected with
influenza virus annually (1,2). Amid growing concern
about influenza pandemics, national preparedness plans
have become essential. In a pandemic hastened by global-
ization, vaccination is not a viable initial solution because
vaccine production requires an estimated 6 months (1,3).
Instead, neuraminidase inhibitors are influenza-specific
antiviral agents that figure strongly in preparedness plans.
Many nations are acquiring stockpiles of these drugs
because of their effectiveness in influenza treatment and
prophylaxis (4). 
Studies have compared the cost-effectiveness of vacci-
nation versus treatment with antiviral agents (5–7), but
only l study has examined the cost-effectiveness of pro-
phylaxis (8). We provide further comparison of the eco-
nomic outcomes of prophylaxis or treatment with antiviral
agents to provide national planners with optimal strategies.
Methods
This study used a decision-based model (Figure 1) to
perform cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses for
stockpiling antiviral agents in Singapore. Oseltamivir was
the drug of choice because of its safety profile (9,10) and
available data on influenza prophylaxis and treatment
(11,12). The model compared 3 strategies: supportive man-
agement (no action), early treatment of clinical influenza
with oseltamivir (treatment only), and prophylaxis in addi-
tion to early treatment (prophylaxis). Costs were assigned
to each outcome, and probabilities at each node were
aggregated as population rates for calculating overall costs
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Figure 1. Decision-based model for strategies during pandemic
influenza. for each outcome. Decision branches were similar for each
strategy, but probabilities at individual nodes differed.
Cost-benefit analyses were used to compare treatment-
only and prophylaxis strategies to taking no action. These
analyses included direct and indirect economic costs, such
as the cost of death. However, quantifying the societal cost
of death is difficult, and cost-effectiveness analyses based
on cost per life saved by treatment only and prophylaxis,
compared to no action, were included. The model was run
by using Excel spreadsheets (Microsoft Corp, Redmond,
WA, USA); details are shown in the Appendix and on Tan
Tock Seng Hospital’s website (http://www.ttsh.com.sg/
doc/Pandemic%20influenza%20in%20Singapore%20-
%20economic%20analysis%20of%20treatment%20and%
20prophylaxis%20stockpiling%20strategies.pdf). Costs
are represented in 2004 Singapore dollars (2004 exchange
rate, USD$1 = SGD$1.6908).
Pandemic influenza is unpredictable: uncertainties sur-
round its occurrence and outcomes (13). Excess deaths in
annual epidemics occur mostly in the elderly (14), but the
1918–1919 Spanish flu pandemic had higher death rates
among adults (15). To account for such uncertainties, the
input variables were modeled as triangular distributions
centered on base values, with ranges corresponding to
minimum and maximum values (Table 1). Sensitivity
analyses, including 1-way analysis, were conducted to
identify variables of highest impact and the outcome’s sen-
sitivity to treatment and prophylaxis stockpiles. Monte
Carlo simulation analyses were performed to determine
outcomes under different scenarios. 
Treatment stockpiles, based on proportions of the pop-
ulation, are used on all influenzalike-illness cases, from
pandemic plan activation until the pandemic ceases or the
stockpile is depleted, whichever comes first. Analysis was
conducted to determine the proportion of untreated
influenza patients and simulation iterations with complete
coverage, by stockpile levels. Further analysis was then
performed for prophylaxis stockpiles where prophylaxis,
by weeks, is given to the population over and above treat-
ment requirements. 
Input Variables
Input variables are shown in Table 1. Conservative val-
ues favoring no action were used to justify alternative
strategies. The study was conducted on Singapore’s 2004
midyear population of 4,240,300 (16), divided into 3 age
groups, each consisting of 2 risk groups (low and high risk,
according to underlying medical conditions predisposing
the patient to influenza complications), for a total of 6
groups that represented differing infection outcomes and
drug responses (13).
The clinical attack rates during the 1918 and 1957 pan-
demics were 29.4% and 24%, respectively (23), and attack
rates in Singapore during the 1967 pandemic were
12.8%–36.4% (22). This study assumed a base clinical
attack rate of 30% (range 10%–50%), corresponding to
rates in other studies (4,13,24).
Case-fatality rates were derived from Singapore’s ex-
cess deaths from interpandemic influenza; hospitalization
and death were assumed to occur only in clinical influen-
za. To reflect hospitalization rates in relation to case-fatal-
ity rates, both rates were correlated. For outpatient visits,
clinical influenza patients were assumed to seek medical
care and take medical leave. However, some patients may
not be treated effectively within 48 hours of infection, and
they were assumed not to benefit from treatment. 
For pandemic duration, influenza activity in tropical
climates commonly rises above the baseline for >12 weeks
(31,33), compared to 6 weeks in temperate climates (34).
This study assumed a 12-week pandemic duration base
value with a range from 6 weeks (average temperate dura-
tion) to 24 weeks (assumed vaccine development).
Individual economic value was calculated from the net
present value of future earnings for average-aged persons
in the respective age groups, adjusted for age. Other costs
included were hospitalizations and work days lost; all costs
were standardized to 2004 Singapore dollars. 
Oseltamivir 
This study relied on international studies on oseltamivir.
Oseltamivir has a good safety profile with insignificant
rates of severe adverse events and drug withdrawal (9).
Costs from side effects were thus assumed to be insignifi-
cant compared to costs for pandemic illness and deaths.
The known safe administration duration of 8 weeks repre-
sents only studied durations (35). Extension is assumed
possible, and the model included up to 24 weeks’ prophy-
laxis. Oseltamivir trials have lacked the power to detect
mortality reductions because influenza deaths in trials are
rare (14), and wide ranges were used to account for uncer-
tainty. Oseltamivir is also less effective in the elderly (24).
Immunity after prophylaxis among those without clinical
infection was assumed to be 35%, as shown during an
influenza study in which 38% of study participants on pro-
phylaxis had serologic infection but no clinical infection
(12). Oseltamivir’s pharmacologic action is selective and is
assumed to be inactive against noninfluenza illnesses. 
Stockpile use depends on the probability of an influen-
za pandemic occurring. Antigenic shifts and reappearances
of past variants were estimated to have pandemic potential
every 8–10 years (31,32). Using oseltamivir’s shelf-life of
4 years and patent expiration in 2016, the model assumed
a conservative base value of 2.25 stockpile cycles before
use (range 1–3.5 cycles) to account for significantly
reduced costs after patent expiration. The model assumed
that all unused stockpiles are lost. 
RESEARCH
96 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2006Results
If no action were taken during a pandemic, the mean
number of simulated deaths in Singapore would be 1,105
(5th and 95th percentiles of 525 and 1,775), with mean
hospital days of 23,098 (10,736, 38,638). The mean eco-
nomic cost would exceed SGD$1.43 billion (0.73, 2.19),
and 78% of all deaths would occur in groups at high risk.
From the sensitivity analyses, the outcome was most sen-
sitive to changes in attack rate and case-fatality rate reduc-
tion with treatment and was sensitive to the variables of
treatment and prophylaxis stockpiles.
Table 2 shows the cost and outcomes of various treat-
ment stockpiles; each shelf-like cycle of the stockpile
(which is 4 years, after which the drug has to be repur-
chased) costs SGD$13.1 million for 10% of the popula-
tion. Stockpiles of <20% did not provide complete
coverage in any simulated iterations, while stockpiles of
>60% always provided complete coverage. The maximal
mean economic benefit of SGD$414 million occurred at a
40% stockpile with 418 lives saved.
The population cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness out-
comes from the Monte Carlo simulation analyses are
Economics of Stockpiling, Singapore
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2006 97shown in Table 3. The treatment-only strategy provided the
best overall economic benefit, and the no-action strategy
was dominated by the treatment-only strategy in cost per
life saved.1 Each additional week of prophylaxis costs
SGD$92 million but reduced the overall economic benefit.
Figure 2 shows that increasing the duration of prophylaxis
increased lives saved. Lives saved from prophylaxis com-
pared to treatment increased significantly only after pro-
phylaxis of >4 weeks and increased steadily until 20
weeks; costs per life saved also increased. 
Table 4 shows that treatment-only provided the greatest
economic benefit across all groups. As prophylaxis dura-
tion increased, economic benefit decreased. However, for
the 3 groups at high risk (Table 1), the mean overall eco-
nomic benefit of up to 24 weeks’ prophylaxis remained
positive compared to that seen if no action was taken.  
The simulated proportion of decisions with treatment
only or 24 weeks’ prophylaxis as the optimal outcome is
shown in Figure 3. At case-fatality rates of 0.05% (similar
to interpandemic epidemics), the decision always favored
treatment-only. With increasing case-fatality rates, the
decision increasingly favored prophylaxis and intersects
between rates of 0.4% and 0.6%. Prophylaxis was always
optimal in case-fatality rates of >1.5%. If no action was
taken with a 5% case-fatality rate (the 1918 pandemic
average) (23), 63,000 deaths, 1.5 million hospital days,
and economic costs of SGD$112 billion would occur.
Treatment-only saved 30,000 lives, benefited the economy
by SGD$28–$84 billion, and required 780,000 hospital
days. Twenty-four weeks of prophylaxis saved 50,000
lives, benefited the economy by SGD$46–$132 billion,
and required 240,000 hospital days.
Discussion
The analyses suggest that treatment is always beneficial
compared to no action and that the optimal treatment
stockpile is 40%–60%: 40% maximizes economic bene-
fits, while 60% maximizes treatment benefits. Compared
to other strategies, treatment-only was the optimal eco-
nomic strategy, while no action was always the least desir-
able option. Although treatment-only saved fewer lives
than prophylaxis, stockpiling costs for treatment were
lower. Prophylaxis was only economically beneficial com-
pared with no action in subpopulations at high risk. 
Substantial outcomes with prophylaxis occurred with
durations of >4 weeks because shorter durations prolonged
the pandemic, were insufficient for immunity, and did not
cover the pandemic’s peak. Increasing duration improved
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1"Dominate" is a term used in cost-effectiveness analyses and
refers to a strategy that is both more efficacious and less costly
than another strategy.outcomes because it covered the pandemic’s peak, but the
improved outcomes tapered off after 20 weeks, resulting in
a sigmoid curve (Figure 2).
In low-risk groups with low death and hospitalization
rates, increasing prophylaxis duration decreased economic
benefit and increased cost per life saved. In contrast,
groups at high risk, who had higher death and hospitaliza-
tion rates, were affected substantially by prophylaxis,
resulting in overall benefits compared to taking no action.
Elderly groups had the smallest populations but the high-
est risk levels and most deaths. However, their lower aver-
age future earnings compared to those of younger age
groups resulted in lower overall benefits.
This study of pandemic outcomes in a tropical climate
is similar to an Israeli study that compared treatment and
prophylaxis strategies (8). Our study used local health out-
come rates but did not include a ring prophylaxis strategy.
Both studies found that oseltamivir treatment is economi-
cally beneficial, but in addition, our study showed that
long-duration prophylaxis is beneficial for high-risk
groups and high case-fatality pandemics.
Limitations of this study include the disregard for intan-
gible costs, such as societal value of health; cost-utility
analyses could address these costs. Also, indirect effects on
national economy and world trade were not considered.
For comparability, neither treatment nor prophylaxis was
assumed to alter the pandemic’s transmission dynamics.
This assumption may be true if therapy is limited to small
subpopulations, but it understates the benefits if infection
is delayed until the pandemic is resolved or vaccine
becomes available; it overestimates the benefits if the pan-
demic continues (4,24). Correlation between attack rates
and pandemic duration was not accounted for, and all pos-
sible combinations were included.
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Figure 2. Lives saved compared with no action, by prophylaxis lev-
els. Mean, 5th, and 95th percentiles based on Monte Carlo simu-
lations are shown.Policy Implications
Stockpiling is insurance in planning for pandemics with
high case-fatality rates, in which more severe outcomes
and higher risks demand higher premiums. Policymakers
should consider lives saved even if economic costs out-
weigh incremental benefits. Prophylaxis of high-risk
groups balances saving lives with economic benefits.
Prophylaxis also reduces hospitalizations, which may oth-
erwise overwhelm the healthcare system. Analysis of peak
pandemic healthcare use is required to determine the
effects of prophylaxis. Other options to reduce a pandem-
ic’s impact, including reducing influenza attack rates by
quarantine or closing borders, should be considered as
alternative strategies. 
The current avian influenza (H5N1) outbreak in Asia,
which has a high case-fatality rate, indicates the need for
decisive action. Oseltamivir is effective against H5N1 and
is used as treatment in Vietnam (36,37). Although resist-
ance has been detected, resistant strains have poor infectiv-
ity (37). Prophylaxis with oseltamivir will reduce illness,
deaths, and economic costs and may reduce spread. If
avian influenza develops species crossover with case fatal-
ities exceeding those of the 1918 Spanish influenza pan-
demic, then stockpiling for treatment and prophylaxis
accrues substantial benefits.  
The decision to stockpile requires predetermined objec-
tives; noneconomic, moral, and ethical implications should
be considered. Treatment-only maximizes economic bene-
fits, while prophylaxis saves most lives. Policymakers
have to act decisively, and determine the subpopulations to
be given priority, to enable preparedness plans to succeed.
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Appendix 
Details of the Equations Used in the Analysis
Antiviral stockpiles will be used on clinical influenza cases
according to the pandemic distribution curve, assumed to be nor-
mally distributed (4). Baseline influenzalike illness rates are
assumed to be constant.
Proportion Untreated
The population proportion with clinical influenza left untreat-
ed because of treatment stockpile deficiencies is calculated as fol-
lows:
No. of doses required = (influenzalike illness per week ×
pandemic duration) + no. of clinical influenza cases
Shortfall of doses for treatment = no. of doses required – no.
of doses available
The proportion untreated is the shortfall of treatment doses
matched to the number of case-patients who require treatment,
according to the pandemic distribution curve. 
Cost of Treatment and Prophylaxis
The cost of treatment was calculated as follows:
Total cost of treatment agerisk group = cost of treatment per
course × stockpile percentage × populationage, risk group
The cost of prophylaxis for 1 stockpile cycle was calculated
as follows:
Total cost of prophylaxisage, risk group = cost of prophylaxis per
week × no. weeks of prophylaxis × populationage, risk group
Cost of Outpatient Clinical Influenza
The medical cost of outpatient clinical influenza was calculat-
ed as follows:
Outpatient medical costsage, risk group = populationage, risk group ×
attack rate × consultation and treatment cost
The cost of outpatient lost days was calculated by using work
days lost for the adult population and unspecified days lost for the
young and elderly populations, as follows:
Economic cost of outpatient lost daysage, risk group = population-
age, risk group × attack rate × outpatient days lost × value of a day
lostage, risk group
Cost of Hospitalizations
The hospitalization cost for influenza-related complications
was calculated by summing direct hospitalization cost with cost
of additional days lost after hospitalization. 
The direct hospitalization cost was calculated as follows:
Economic cost of hospitalizationage, risk group = populationage, risk
group × attack rate × hospitalization rate age, risk group × length of stay
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Figure 3. Proportion of decisions for treatment or 24 weeks pro-
phylaxis, by case-fatality rate. age, risk group × (hospitalization cost + value of a day lost age, risk group) 
The cost from additional days lost was calculated as
follows:
Economic cost of additional days lost after hospitalization =
population age, risk group × attack rate × hospitalization rateage, risk group
× additional days lostage, risk group × value of a day lostage, risk group
Cost from Influenza Deaths
The cost from influenza deaths is calculated as follows:
Economic cost from influenza deaths = populationage, risk group
× attack rate × case-fatality rateage, risk group × net present value of
future earningsage, risk group
Economic Calculations
For cost-benefit comparisons, the following equation is used:
Overall benefit = overall costtreatment only or prophylaxis – overall
costno action
For the cost-effectiveness comparisons, the following equa-
tion is used:
Cost per-life-saved compared to no action = (cost excluding
cost per lifetreatment-only or prophylaxis – cost excluding cost per lifeno
action) / (deathsno action – deathstreatment-only or prophylaxis)
The individual costs that constitute the total costs are calcu-
lated for the strategies of no action, treatment-only, and prophy-
laxis as follows:
Overall costno action, treatment-only, prophylaxis = Σ (populationage, risk
group × probability of outcomeclinical influenza, hospitalization, death × cost of
outcomeclinical influenza, hospitalization, death × effectivenesstreatment-only, pro-
phylaxis) + cost of strategytreatment-only, prophylaxis
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